Small arms and light weapons 1 that fall into the wrong hands often become tools of oppression, used to commit violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. Th ey frequently exacerbate situations of regional instability and armed confl ict and hinder post-confl ict reconstruction. According to recent fi gures put forward by the Conventional Arms Branch of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, there are over 600 million small arms and 
light weapons in circulation worldwide. "Of 49 major conflicts in the 1990s, 47 were waged with small arms as the weapons of choice. Small arms are responsible for over half a million deaths per year, including 300,000 in armed conflict and 200,000 more from homicides and suicides." 2 The small arms problem has many interrelated and interdependent facets, from the conditions that create demand for these weapons to the abuses they facilitate and their rampant availability. Controlling cross-border transfers of weapons is a particular challenge for the international community because it cannot be fully addressed without the concerted action of all States. It is a typical collective action problem, where lower regulatory standards or lesser regulatory capacity of a few States can usurp the best intentions of the rest. Too easily, small arms find their way to those who abuse them because States have not sufficiently controlled what leaves their territory and to whom it goes.
Increasingly, attention is being given to the nexus between the availability of small arms and the perpetration of violent acts on a large scale. This has led some States to include end-use criteria based on human rights and humanitarian law in their arms transfer laws and policies. This development is a positive step in the fight against the misuse of small arms. The trend, however, is not followed by all major arms-exporting nations, and the international law standards used to assess whether or not a transfer should be authorized are by no means interpreted uniformly or consistently. The lack of comprehensiveness and uniformity results in a permissive environment for the continued transfer of weapons to recipients likely to use them in violation of international law.
Momentum is growing in support of a proposed international instrument that would codify the notion that States must prevent weapons from leaving their territory when there is a known risk that their end-use will involve serious violations of international law. 3 Building on the message of "no weapons for abuse", the proposal seeks to prohibit States from becoming accomplices in the violent behaviour of others, whether they are other States, 1 "Small arms are weapons designed for personal use, while light weapons are designed for use by several persons serving as a crew. Examples of small arms include revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifl es, sub-machine guns, assault rifl es and light machine-guns. Light weapons include heavy machine-guns, some types of grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, and portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems. Most small arms and light weapons would not be lethal without their ammunition. Ammunition and explosives thus form an integral part of small arms and light weapons used in confl icts. Th ey include cartridges (rounds) for small arms, shells and missiles for light weapons, anti-personnel and anti-tank hand grenades, landmines, explosives, and mobile containers with missiles or shells for single-action anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems" (description taken from the Report of the armed non-State Parties, corporations or individuals. Those promoting the new treaty argue that its underlying principle is rooted in the law of State responsibility. This article explores that argument and discusses some inherent limitations in applying the law of inter-State relations to the problem of arms transfers. It seeks to clarify the legal basis for adopting a global agreement on international arms transfers and to home in on the norms of international law that best support this initiative. The first section of the article explores the notion of "complicity" under the law of State responsibility, a notion that is conceptually at the heart of the principle expounded by the promoters of the proposed treaty. The conclusion reached is that while it may provide a sound doctrinal grounding for that treaty, the prohibition alone of complicity in inter-State relations offers an insufficient basis for preventing States from licensing weapons transfers to abusers of human rights and humanitarian law. In a second section, primary rules of international law are considered. This enquiry into human rights law, international humanitarian law and international criminal law yields a more complete picture of the legal regime applicable to States and individuals that supply weapons for abuse. The third section is devoted to current regional and international initiatives that lend weight to the proposed treaty, while the fourth and final section of the article offers some thoughts on how to transform the current draft version of the treaty into a compelling and effective legally binding instrument.
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Complicity under the law of State responsibility
International law limits the transfer of small arms in a number of ways. One of these is the specifi c prohibition on the use -and derivatively on the transfer -of certain weapons by virtue of principles of international humanitarian law. 4 Another is the prohibition of transfers to specifi c States or parties as dictated by mandatory embargoes imposed by the United Nations Security Council. A less obvious but no less important limitation is contingent upon the end-use of the weapons. In situations where there are no prohibitions aff ecting the transferred weapons, where the country of destination is not subject to an arms embargo, and where compliance with national licensing requirements is such that the transaction is in line with domestic law, international law may nonetheless prohibit a State from transferring weapons because of the way in which the weapons will be used in the recipient State. Under the law of State responsibility, if the decision to transfer weapons facilitates the commission of an internationally wrongful act, such as the perpetration of a war crime or the abusive behaviour of a police force, then the transferring State may be held responsible for making such violations possible.
The rule prohibiting the complicit behaviour of States is a "secondary" or "derivative" form of responsibility, which targets States that aid or assist others in violating international law. The International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility 5 represent the first attempt to codify "complicity" in connection with the law regulating inter-State relations. 6 Articles 16 and 41(2) both prohibit aiding and assisting States in violating international law. Article 16 is more often quoted in the literature on arms transfers because it covers aid and assistance in the context of any violation of international law. Article 41(2) has a narrower application but it contains a powerful basis for arguing that where the most egregious violations of international law are being perpetrated, States face an absolute prohibition against transferring weapons to those responsible for the violations.
Article 16
Article 16 reads as follows:
"A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: (a) That State does so with the knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State."
Broadly speaking, what this would mean in the context of small arms transfers is that a State transferring weapons to another State which uses them to commit internationally wrongful acts (acts which the transferring State knew about) may be held responsible for doing so if it amounts to providing aid or assistance. According to the International Law Commission's Commentary, responsibility under Article 16 is limited in three ways.
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The first limitation, which is contained in the text of the provision, is that the aiding State must have knowledge of the circumstances that make the conduct of the assisted State unlawful. The Commentary explains that in providing material or financial assistance, "a State does not normally assume the risk that its assistance or aid may be used to" violate international law.
8 "Knowledge" as a standard of proof applicable to States can be assessed in light of public statements and official policies of the relevant organs of the State. Today, information about the human rights and humanitarian law record of States is widely available, whether through international organizations, non-governmental organizations or the media. There may frequently, then, be occasions when constructive knowledge (i.e. that can be expected from exercise of reasonable care) or objective (actual, direct) knowledge contingent on the circumstances prevailing in each case would be an acceptable interpretation of this standard of proof. As such, where the information needed in order to assess whether or not a State is using weapons in an abusive manner is widespread, then the exporting State ought to have knowledge of that information. Proliferation of information about a State's abuse of weapons could satisfy the knowledge requirement of a transferring State when it comes to determining its responsibility for supplying the weapons that aid or assist in the commission of an internationally wrongful act under Article 16.
A second and related limitation to the attribution of State responsibility under Article 16 concerns the requirement that the aid or assistance (here, the supply of weapons) be given with a view to facilitating the commission of the wrongful act. According to the Commentary, " [t] his limits the application of Article 16 to those cases where the aid or assistance given is clearly linked to the subsequent wrongful conduct."
9 The Commentary then goes on to say that a State is only responsible if "the relevant State organ intended, by the aid or assistance given, to facilitate the occurrence of the wrongful conduct…"
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The intent requirement being introduced here is surprising since the Draft Articles claim to be neutral on the question of "wrongful intent", focusing instead on the objective conduct of States and leaving the mental element to be defined by the primary obligations at issue.
11 Moreover, a previous draft version of Article 16 was not interpreted as requiring intent to facilitate the commission of the wrongful conduct. In fact, nothing in the wording of the provision suggests such a condition. 12 Perhaps an interpretation that seems close to the heart of the matter is that the second limitation is really about ensuring that supplying the weapons contributed materially to the wrongful act. In order for the complicit State to be found responsible, there must be a causal relationship between the act of aiding or assisting and the ensuing violation of international law.
In the context of transfers of small arms, imposing a requirement of intent would be particularly unfortunate since it would ignore the lucrative aspect of arms deals. States that transfer weapons are often driven by commercial reasons, which include facilitating money-making deals for important 9 Ibid., p. 149, para. 5. 10 Ibid. (emphasis added). 11 See ibid., p. 81, para. 3, and p. 84, para. 10. 12 "Further credence is given to questioning whether there really is an intent requirement by reviewing a recent report of the ILC. In the report, the ILC takes note of government suggestions to get rid of the intent requirement entirely. (…) In response to these suggestions, the Special Rapporteur insinuates that requiring intent within the Article is not obligatory and may be misplaced: 'It is very doubtful whether under existing international law a State takes the risk that aid or assistance will be used for purposes which happen to be unlawful; hence some requirement of knowledge, or at least notice, seems inevitable. domestic manufacturers. 13 In the post-Cold war setting, rarely will weapons transfers be motivated by purely political considerations, making it difficult to establish that a transferring State had the intent to facilitate the commission of, for instance, human rights violations. One author suggests that, as a rule, whenever an organ of the international community (Security Council, General Assembly, International Court of Justice, Human Rights Commission) establishes that a State threatens the international peace, assistance to the perpetrator is not only a violation of the Charter but also an act of complicity.
14 In such cases intention should be presumed because the wrongful behaviour is a matter of common knowledge. 15 Another author recently argued that where violations of international humanitarian law are at issue, ongoing assistance to a known violator should be presumed to be given with a view to facilitating further violations and, as a consequence, such assistance can trigger the application of the rules of State responsibility. 16 Finally, responsibility under Article 16 is limited by the condition that the obligation breached must be equally opposable to both the violating and complicit States. In the case of weapons transfers, this third requirement is of little consequence. The categories of wrongful conduct that are relevant to small arms and light weapons include serious violations of human rights and grave breaches of international humanitarian law, as well as violations of the prohibition against the use of force and interference in the domestic affairs of a State, all of which are prohibited by norms of international law opposable to all States in the international community.
Article 41(2)
While the Draft Articles do not recognize the existence of "State crimes" as a special category of wrongful acts, they nonetheless reflect the fact that certain violations of international law attract particular consequences because of their gravity. The drafters refer to these violations as "serious breaches of obligations arising under peremptory norms of general international law", specifying that in order to be considered "serious", such breaches must involve a gross or systematic failure by the responsible State to fulfil the obligations. 17 Today, the norms that are widely accepted as peremptory in nature include the prohibitions of aggression, genocide, slavery, racial discrimination and 13 "A State, which enjoys substantial military sales to an abusive regime and continues those sales, is motivated signifi cantly by economic interests. Regardless of the motivation, however, the eff ect on the people at the receiving end of the human rights abuses is the same. Article 16 should be designed to prevent human rights and international law abuses, regardless of the assisting State's intentions" (Nahapetian, ibid., p. 127). 14 Bernhard Graefrath, "Complicity in the law of international responsibility", "No State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach (…), nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation."
The first of the two duties of abstention incumbent upon States is one of non-recognition, which includes both acts of formal recognition and acts that imply recognition. 22 Recognition involves accepting the legitimacy of the situation. Transferring weapons could theoretically qualify as an act implying recognition to the extent that the goods legitimize the power of the violating State. It is more likely, however, that transferring weapons would breach the second obligation codified in Article 41(2), namely the obligation not to aid or assist the responsible State in maintaining the unlawful situation.
According to the Commentary, this second prohibition goes beyond Article 16 by including conduct "after the fact" which maintains the situation created by the violation, regardless of whether or not the breach itself is a continuing one. 23 Whereas for less serious internationally wrongful acts, a finding of complicity rests on an established nexus between the aid or assistance and the ensuing violation, it is sufficient where peremptory norms are concerned for the aiding State to have contributed to maintaining the illegal situation. This is directly relevant to the transfer of small arms, given the obvious connection between the availability of weapons and a State's ability to sustain a situation created by its wrongful conduct. The Commentary also mentions that the requirement of knowledge has been left out of Article 41 (2) transfers to non-State Parties, it is desirable to ensure that the international standards advanced in the context of a proposed treaty apply to all transfers, regardless of the recipient's State or non-State character. Th e Draft Articles and the notion of complicity therein are, alone, insuffi cient to support such an approach. For our purposes, the other inadequacy of the notion of complicity concerns the lack of guidance it offers regarding the specific steps required to control the undesirable flow of small arms to abusers of the weapons. As a practical matter, to be effective requires more than holding States responsible after the fact, even where such responsibility can be established under the criteria of Articles 16 and 41(2). For the small arms victim of an abusive security force, there is little comfort in knowing that the State that supplied the tools of their oppression may bear secondary responsibility under international law. Effective control of small arms transfers begins with the adoption of measures implemented by States in advance, such as establishing and operating a licensing regime that includes end-use criteria grounded in international law and provides for sanctions against individuals operating outside the regime.
Beyond complicity
A key entry point for introducing notions of human rights and humanitarian law is the authority of the State to license companies that manufacture small arms and light weapons and persons that export, import, transport, insure and finance arms deals. While licensing may not solve the variety of problems associated with the illicit trade in small arms, it is nonetheless an important way in which States can begin to implement their commitment to the protection of those fundamental rights that are constantly being flouted with the assistance of these weapons. This section explores how the scrutiny that is needed for a credible and effective licensing process can be supported by the primary obligations of States under international law. The relevant areas of international law include obligations deriving from international humanitarian law, obligations associated with international human rights law and recent developments in the field of international criminal law.
Obligation to "ensure respect" for international humanitarian law A distinguishing feature of international humanitarian law is the customary obligation incumbent upon States not only to respect the law but also to ensure its respect by other contracting States, as laid down in Article 1 common to the four Geneva Conventions. 29 In a judgment delivered in January 2000, the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) had this to say about compliance with humanitarian norms:
"As a consequence of their absolute character, these norms of international humanitarian law do not pose synallagmatic obligations, i.e. obligations of a State vis-à-vis another State. Rather (…) they lay down obligations towards the international community as a whole, with the consequence that each and every member of the international community has a 'legal interest' in their observance and consequently a legal entitlement to demand respect for such obligations."
30
There is still some debate as to how exactly States are expected to implement their obligation to "ensure respect" for international humanitarian law. However, what is clear is that, in the face of serious violations of the Geneva Conventions or of Additional Protocol I, States are under a duty to act in order to bring the violations to an end. This obligation is codified in Article 89 of Additional Protocol I 31 and echoed in Article 41(1) of the Draft Articles, which stipulates that "States shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach" of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of international law. This duty to act or to cooperate generally finds expression in the behaviour of States within the United Nations. In response to violations of humanitarian principles, the General Assembly, the Security Council or the Commission on Human Rights will call on perpetrators to abide by the rules; offer the good offices of the Secretary-General; dispatch observer missions; launch peacekeeping operations; etc.
32 All of these measures fall "within the purview of a collective willingness to ensure respect for international humanitarian law in cases where serious violations occur." 33 In the framework of the United Nations, imposing arms embargoes is one of the ways in which the international community is increasingly responding to the existence or impending threat of violent conflict involving violations of have a legal obligation to abide by embargoes enacted by the Security Council and a duty to implement measures to ensure that persons within their jurisdiction also comply with those embargoes.
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While the legal basis for imposing and enforcing arms embargoes falls outside the realm of international humanitarian law, a quick glance at the parties currently embargoed reveals that this type of response on the part of the international community is closely related to the perpetration of serious violations of the laws of war. In the past two years, with the Security Council becoming more active on the question of child soldiers, arms embargoes have been threatened against parties that recruit children into their ranks. 46 This suggests that beyond the general association of small arms with violations of international humanitarian law, a specific link is being authoritatively established between the availability of small arms and violations of the rights of children in armed conflict. One may reasonably conclude that embargoes in such circumstances are a reflection of States' Common Article 1 obligation to ensure respect for international humanitarian law.
For political reasons, arms embargoes do not follow a consistent pattern of imposition and, when they are pronounced, considerable difficulties plague their implementation and enforcement. Respecting arms embargoes involves an exporting State refraining from selling arms, but it also includes restricting companies and individuals within the exporting State's jurisdiction from doing so. Such restrictions are typically borne out in the exporting State's arms export licensing regime, although they can also be included in legislation specifically prohibiting transfers to a particular country or party. Hence the relevance of discussing the adoption of international standards for licensing arms transfers and the importance of placing respect for international humanitarian law at the heart of the discussion.
In a 1999 study on arms availability, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) recommended the development of national and international codes of conduct limiting arms transfers according to indicators of the level of respect for international humanitarian law by the recipient State. disseminate the laws of war to its armed forces? 48 Has the recipient State enacted enforcement measures for the repression of grave breaches?
49 Such implementation measures form part of a recipient State's "due diligence" obligation to prevent and punish violations of international humanitarian law within its territory or by parties for which it is responsible. This obligation is particularly relevant to situations of internal armed conflict where many violations are perpetrated by individuals over whom the State has no direct control.
Ensuring
Human rights: A duty to cooperate in their protection and fulfi lment
In human rights law, the unfortunate paradox is that while human rights are said to be universal, their violations are limited by territoriality as well as by citizenship. The responsibility of States toward individuals outside their jurisdiction is vague and weak.
50 "Territoriality of law conflicts with the postulated universality of human rights because individuals cannot hold a State other than their own responsible for violating their rights; it is their State that should hold another responsible. This, however, seldom happens."
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The notion that States should be obliged to investigate the end-use of the weapons they authorize for international transfer has been compared to their obligation to ensure that persons who are removed, expelled or extradited from their jurisdiction will not face persecution. 52 The similarity between the duty of 'non-refoulement' under refugee law 53 and the law regulating international arms transfers lies in action at home ('refoulement' of a refugee or licensing the 55 and maintained that the Italian authorities had exposed the plaintiff to the risk of "indiscriminate" use of mines by Iraq. In dismissing the claim, the Commission stated that:
"the applicant's injury can not be seen as a direct consequence of the failure of the Italian authorities to legislate on arms transfers. There is no immediate relationship between the mere supply, even if not properly regulated, of weapons and the possible 'indiscriminate' use thereof in a third country, the latter's action constituting the direct and decisive cause of the accident which the applicant suffered."
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The Tugar decision illustrates the difficulties that are inherent in attempting to link a State's affirmative duty in the realm of arms licensing to a right of action for victims beyond its borders. Clearly, more work is needed to flesh out the positive obligation of States to cooperate in the transnational protection and fulfilment of human rights. The adoption of a treaty on arms transfers whereby States recognize some responsibility in preventing the perpetration of serious human rights violations outside their jurisdiction would go some of the way toward making international law relevant to small arms victims. However, without such a treaty, there appears to be little in international human rights law that can be interpreted as imposing an obligation for States to investigate the end-use of the weapons they allow out of their territory. This does not mean that international human rights law is irrelevant to the development of the law in this area. Indeed, it may shed considerable light on the assessment of recipient States' behaviour, which will be useful in developing standards for such licensing regimes as may be required.
Under international human rights law, States are not only responsible for the actions of their agents. They also have a duty to prevent and punish patterns of abuse committed by private persons operating within their jurisdiction, whether or not they are acting under the control of the State. Failing to take the necessary steps to protect individuals from acts of violence perpetrated by nonState parties may render the State as guilty as if its officials had committed the violation. 57 In some cases, the obligation to protect individuals from violations perpetrated by private parties is part and parcel of the State's obligation not to commit the violation itself. This is the case for the prohibition of torture, which is particularly sweeping due to the importance it has been accorded by the international community. 58 The failure to adopt the necessary measures to prevent acts of torture from being carried out on one's territory may amount to more than a violation of the "due diligence" standard and be treated as a breach of the international norm itself.
In order that international standards for licensing arms transfers take into account the due diligence obligation of recipient States, it may be useful for the drafters of a treaty on arms transfers to follow the approach proposed by the ICRC in the field of international humanitarian law. This would involve enumerating a number of objective criteria that would serve as human rights benchmarks in deciding whether or not licences should be granted. For instance, authorization might be given for the export of guns to a police force that operates in accordance with the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. 59 Conversely, failure to implement these basic principles could form the basis for refusing to grant a licence.
International criminal law: The individual responsibility of arms traffi ckers
The picture that is unfolding of the international obligations of States in the field of arms transfers would not be complete without mentioning international criminal law. Even when governments enact adequate controls over private arms traffickers, there continue to be individuals who act beyond the reach of national law. Logically and practically, a commitment to human rights and humanitarian norms in the licensing process should be accompanied by measures of enforcement against the middlemen who facilitate circumventions of licensing schemes. In fulfilling their Common Article 1 obligation to ensure respect for international humanitarian law, States have a duty to repress grave breaches of the laws of war. It is therefore relevant to enquire into the nature of the international criminal responsibility that attaches to the act of supplying weapons to persons responsible for committing war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide.
Here, we return to the notion of "complicity", but this time as it applies to the individual criminal responsibility of the traffi ckers concerned. Under international criminal law, the activities of arms traffi ckers are most likely to be caught by rules that prohibit supplying material assistance to the perpetrator of a crime. Although the test for individual accomplice liability diff ers from that used to establish the complicity of States, the underlying sentiment is the same. Th is test was set out in 1997 by the Trial Chamber of the ICTY in the Tadic case:
"First, there is a requirement of intent, which involves awareness of the act of participation coupled with a conscious decision to participate by planning, instigating, ordering, committing, or otherwise aiding and abetting in the commission of a crime. Second, the prosecution must prove that there was participation in that the conduct of the accused contributed to the commission of the illegal act." 60 The notion of "aiding and abetting" was further defined by the same Chamber in a 1998 decision: "[T]he legal ingredients of aiding and abetting in international criminal law [are as follows]: the actus reus consists of practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime. The mens rea required is the knowledge that these acts assist in the commission of the offence. This notion of aiding and abetting is to be distinguished from the notion of common design, where the actus reus consists of participation in a joint criminal enterprise and the mens rea required is intent to participate." 61 The "aiding and abetting" provision of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) establishes criminal responsibility if a person aids, abets or otherwise assists in the commission or the attempted commission of a crime, including by providing the means for its commission. 62 In other words, supplying the weapons used to commit or attempt to commit one of the crimes for which the ICC has jurisdiction is sufficient to give rise to responsibility as an accomplice. 63 In terms of the actus reus (objective element), there is no requirement that the means have contributed to the ensuing crime; nor is there a requirement that the means have had a substantial effect on the crime. Clearly, the Rome Statute defines the crime of complicity in a wider manner than its ad hoc counterparts since "a direct and substantial assistance is not necessary and (…) the act of assistance need not be a condition sine qua non of the crime." 64 Nevertheless, the culpa (subjective element) remains higher than what is provided for in the context of State responsibility, for the obvious reason that the consequences of a finding of guilt are far greater for individuals whose liberty is at stake. Mere knowledge is not enough; the accomplice must intend to facilitate the perpetration of the crime.
None of the Statutes of the current international tribunals (ICTY, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and ICC) specifically identify, for the purpose of establishing criminal liability for "aiding" in the commission of a crime, the provision of weapons or other concrete military assistance as constituting practical assistance. However, there are indications of a growing trend toward interpreting them as such.
In a 1998 decision, the Trial Chamber of the ICTR stated that the elements of the crime of complicity in genocide included "procuring means, such as weapons, instruments or any other means, used to commit genocide, with the accomplice knowing that such means would be used for such a purpose." 65 In 2003, the Prosecutor of the SCSL indicted Charles Taylor, charging the former head of State of having "aided and abetted" abuses perpetrated by Sierra Leonean rebels through the provision of financing, training, weapons, and other support and encouragement. 66 Reflecting on who might be criminally liable for complicity in Sierra Leone, a leading expert in the field of international criminal law writes: "Given the intense publicity about war crimes and other atrocities in Sierra Leone, made known not only in specialized documents such as those issued by the United Nations and international non-governmental organizations but also by the popular media, a court ought to have little difficulty in concluding that diamond traders, airline pilots and executives, small arms suppliers and so on have knowledge of their contribution to the conflict and to the offences being committed." 67 This hypothesis appears to be supported by the SCSL's Chief of Investigations, Alan White, who, in an interview with Human Rights Watch, stated: "If a person is the principal supplier of arms and also knows that the weapons will be misused, then this person certainly would have individual criminal responsibility and would be prosecuted [by the Court]." 68 Although international criminal law provides an avenue for prosecuting private arms traffickers, for the time being this avenue remains largely unexplored. 69 Practically speaking, individuals who carry out brokering activities still have a lot of leeway to divert weapons to illicit destinations. 70 The prospect of being charged with complicity to an international crime still appears too remote for most brokers to think twice before diverting weapons to embargoed destinations or parties, or to known human rights abusers. To a large extent, their activities remain unregulated and even where regulations exist, there are important gaps or loopholes that make it possible for this lucrative business to flourish. 71 Many States are reluctant to extend their jurisdiction to nationals having taken up residence abroad or to illicit brokering activities carried out by nationals abroad. Moreover, the political weight of certain arms brokering circles is not to be underestimated in terms of its ability to hinder any process aimed at curbing the business. However, the wind may be changing as momentum grows among various segments of the international community for tighter regulation of brokering activities. 
Paving the way to a global agreement on arms transfers
In July 2001, the United Nations convened an international conference with a view to encouraging the development of national, regional and international strategies that tackle the many problems associated with small arms and light weapons. Th e Programme of Action endorsed by the United Nations only indirectly refers to the issue of government-authorized transfers, choosing instead to focus on what it calls the "illicit trade in small arms". Nevertheless, in one provision the Programme of Action does refer to the obligation of States to assess applications for export authorizations "according to strict national regulations and procedures that cover all small arms and light weapons and are consistent with the existing responsibilities of States under relevant international law." 73 Also included is a commitment on the part of participating States to develop adequate legislation regulating brokering activities. 74 A number of recent regional initiatives, mostly of a politically binding nature, have echoed this commitment.
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Earlier in 2001, on 31 May, the General Assembly adopted the UN Firearms Protocol, 76 an international instrument aimed at improving cooperation in clamping down on the illegal manufacturing of and trade in firearms. Parties are to pass legislation criminalizing any illicit manufacturing and traffi cking of fi rearms, establish an eff ective export control system, and share information as well as technical experience and training with each other to enable cooperation in preventing illegal shipments of fi rearms. Signatories are also expected to keep records for at least 10 years on their marking and transfer activities so that it will be possible to trace the movement of fi rearms across borders.
Th e Protocol, which came into force on 3 July 2005, focuses on organized crime and does not apply to State-authorized sales. However, on the question of arms brokering, it represents a useful step to the extent that it requires the registration of brokers operating within the territory of States Parties as well as the licensing or authorization of brokering activities. Moreover, all information relating to brokers must be shared. To date, the Protocol remains the fi rst legally-binding international agreement on small arms to have been successfully negotiated.
At a regional level, a number of initiatives (model regulations, handbooks, best practice guidelines, etc.) call upon States to consider the risk that transferred weapons will be used in violation of international law when deciding whether or not to grant arms exporting and brokering licences. 79 Other regional initiatives adopt a tougher stance. Two of these are well on their way to imposing legally binding measures for their Member States and, as such, merit some exploration here. Th e fi rst is the European Union Code of Conduct for Arms Exports, which, along with the EU Council Common Position on Arms Brokering, represents the most important attempt at introducing human rights and humanitarian criteria into the arms export and brokering licensing process of European Member States. Th e second is the West Africa Moratorium on Importation, Exportation, and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons, which is unique in its attempt at keeping small arms out of an entire region and, through its shortcomings, illustrates the need for global standards rooted in international law. Currently under review as to its content and legal status, 82 the EU Code is noteworthy for setting forth eight criteria for the issuance of export licensing. These are divided into two categories: conditions under which the denial of licences is mandatory, 83 and elements that must be taken into consideration when deciding whether or not to issue a licence. ; not contributing to a situation of armed confl ict or aggravating existing tensions or confl icts in the country of destination (Criterion 3); respect for the prohibition on aggression: transfers are prohibited where there exists a clear risk that the export would be used aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial claim (Criterion 4). 84 Th e national security of Member States as well as that of friendly and allied countries (Criterion 5); the behaviour of the recipient country toward the international community, with particular consideration being given to its support or encouragement of terrorism and international organized crime; its compliance with its international commitments, in particular on the non-use of force, including under international humanitarian law applicable to international and non-international confl icts; its commitment to nonproliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in particular the signature, ratifi cation and implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament conventions (Criterion 6); the risk that the equipment be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions (Criterion 7); the compatibility of arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country: reports from the UNDP, World Bank, IMF and OECD are to be taken into account in assessing the likelihood that the proposed export would seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country (Criterion 8). 85 Th e operative provisions outline reporting procedures as well as intergovernmental denial notifi cation and consultation mechanisms where governments hold diff erent views regarding the application of the EU Code criteria to licence requests. With the adoption of a User's Guide in January 2004, which has been recently revised and is soon to be published, it is expected that procedures will be improved and clarifi ed.
European Union Code of Conduct
international NGOs 86 and Members of the European Parliament. 87 An analysis of the criteria agreed upon by EU Member States yields two general observations.
The first observation concerns the standard of proof chosen by the EU and how it relates to our earlier discussion of the prohibition of complicity under the law of State responsibility. 88 Under Criteria 2 and 4 of the EU Code, licence applications should be refused where there exists a clear risk that the exported goods will be used in violation of international law. This standard appears more objective than "knowledge", despite the high threshold conveyed by the use of the adjective "clear". This suggests that the EU has gone further than the Draft Articles by prohibiting transfers regardless of whether or not the supplying State actually or constructively knows the circumstances of a violation of international law or, indeed, facilitates the commission of such a violation. It is not merely a matter of refraining from cooperating in the violations of others. Indeed, the serious nature of the conduct at issue entails a positive obligation on the part of States to enquire into the end-use of the weapons they allow out of their territory. The wording chosen by the EU Member States arguably reflects an evolution in the law applicable to small arms transfers by placing potential victims of these weapons at the centre of the licensing process.
The second observation concerns what may be the most significant weakness in the criteria put forward by the EU Code. Despite the fact that respect for international humanitarian law is incumbent upon all States, it is only mentioned in Criterion 6 as an element to be taken into account by Member States, whereas respect for human rights law forms the basis of a mandatory criterion (Criterion 2). 89 What's more, the reference to international humanitarian law in Criterion 6 is ambiguous. It could be read as associating the obligation to respect the laws of international and non-international armed conflict with the non-use of force. This absurd association was certainly not intended by the drafters of the EU Code but the choice of language bears mention because, apart from anything else, it reveals a perception that respect for the laws of war or jus in bello is somehow subsidiary to respect for jus ad bellum. 89 Criterion Six reads: "Member States will take into account inter alia the record of the buyer country with regard to: a) its support or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime; b) its compliance with its international commitments, in particular on the non-use of force, including under international humanitarian law applicable to international and non-international confl icts; c) its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in particular the signature, ratifi cation and implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament conventions referred to in sub-para b) of Criterion One. "
The discrepancy in the importance the EU Code appears to be giving to respect for human rights and humanitarian law is not unusual. Arms transfer documents adopted by States and regional organizations more commonly refer to the recipient's respect for human rights and the risk of weapons being used for internal repression than to the recipient's respect for international humanitarian law. Commenting on this fact, the ICRC recently stated: "[I]n our experience, it is a common misperception that a separate humanitarian law criterion is unnecessary when a reference to human rights already exists, because the reference to human rights is believed to implicitly cover humanitarian law as well. While some violations of humanitarian law would be covered by a requirement to consider the risk of human rights violations, many serious violations of humanitarian law would fall outside such a provision. This includes violations related to the conduct of hostilities, which are particularly relevant to the use of weapons." 90 While commitments relating to the non-use of force and respect for human rights are particularly important for States to consider in the licensing process, humanitarian law commitments are also (distinct and) relevant, especially when the weapons transferred constitute military equipment.
The ICRC has urged EU Member States to amend the Code: a separate and explicit criterion should be included prohibiting weapons transfers if they are likely to be used to violate international humanitarian law. 91 The ICRC has also reiterated its plea 92 for a set of indicators that could assist States in assessing the likelihood of weapons being used in violation of international humanitarian law, arguing that "[a] strict criterion on paper cannot effectively prevent weapons from falling into the hands of those likely to use them to commit abuses, unless all Member States consistently apply it." 93 These indicators point to the "due diligence" obligation of States to take measures to prevent and punish breaches of IHL, reinforcing the notion that the duty to ensure respect for 90 Brokering activities are defined as "activities of persons and entities negotiating or arranging transactions that may involve the transfer of items on the EU Common List of Military Equipment or who buy, sell or arrange the transfer of such items that are in their ownership from a third country to another third country". With this definition, the EU captures activities that are central to the transfer of small arms and that had, until then, remained unregulated in most Member States. 96 The Common Position explicitly links the licensing of brokering transactions to the arms export licensing process at Article 3(1), when it states: "Member States will assess applications for a licence or written authorization for specific brokering transactions against the provisions of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports". In other words, the criteria laid down by the Code of Conduct for licensing small arms exports also apply to the licensing of brokering activities.
Th e EU Code of Conduct for Arms Exports and the EU Council Common Position on arms brokering represent important, welcome attempts to make States more responsible for transfers of arms from within their territories -particularly to the extent that account must be taken of the likely consequences of transfers to human rights and humanitarian law abusers. It may be hoped that the EU will continue to off er leadership in this area as the law evolves.
The Economic Community of West African States Moratorium
In response to the particularly severe nature of the problem of small arms proliferation in West Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 97 decided in 1998 to embargo itself voluntarily, so to speak. Th e regional organization concluded a politically binding agreement proclaiming a moratorium on "the importation, exportation and manufacture of light weapons in ECOWAS Member States," 98 with exemptions being permitted for reasons of security. Th e Moratorium was intended to pave the way for the development of a region-wide strategy on arms proliferation, in particular, and disarmament in general. Strongly supported by the international community, the Moratorium was publicly adhered to by a number of States outside the region, thereby broadening the scope of its eff ects. Member States of the Wassenaar Arrangement (a grouping of the world's largest arms exporting nations), 99 the EU and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 100 have all pledged their commitment to the Moratorium and some have made substantial fi nancial contributions to assist in its implementation. 101 Between 1999 and 2004, the United Nations Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) was active in the region, building internal capacity, advising on legislative reform and enforcing border controls to sustain implementation eff orts. Since early 2005, PCASED has been replaced by the ECOWAS Small Arms Project (ECOSAP), which focuses on providing technical advice on the implementation of small arms control and reports directly to ECOWAS. 102 Despite the enthusiasm that the Moratorium has elicited, its track record in eff ectively curbing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in West Africa is disappointing. Aside from the problems associated with lack of political will, weakness of national security institutions and violations by some ECOWAS Member States, 103 the Moratorium faces built-in obstacles. Th e ban it proclaims may be far-reaching, encompassing private companies and governments, but it lacks enforceable sanctions and the exemption procedure does not include an oversight mechanism to ensure that those weapons that may be imported are used as intended. Th e projected conversion of the Moratorium into a legally binding and also benefits from the support of a growing number of States as well as numerous non-governmental organizations. 110 This section offers some observations on the Draft Framework Convention in light of our discussion of international law limitations on small arms transfers.
Article 3 of the current version of the Draft Framework Convention is the key provision embodying the principle of "no weapons for abuse". It is titled "Limitations Based on Use" and reads as follows:
"A Contracting Party shall not authorise international transfers of arms in circumstances in which it has knowledge or ought reasonably to have knowledge that transfers of arms of the kind under consideration are likely to be: a. used in breach of the United Nations Charter or corresponding rules of customary international law, in particular those on the prohibition on the threat or use of force in international relations; b. used in the commission of serious violations of human rights; c. used in the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law applicable in international or non-international armed conflict; d. used in the commission of genocide or crimes against humanity; e. diverted and used in the commission of any of the acts referred to in the preceding sub-paragraphs of this Article."
Underlying principle of international law
The commentary appended to the draft document explains that "[t]he responsibility of the Contracting Party of export to prohibit arms transfers under [draft Article 3] flows from the obligation not to participate in the internationally wrongful acts of another State."
111 It further states that the principle underlying Article 3 of the Draft Framework Convention is rooted in Article 16 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility. The drafters' decision to limit the legal basis to Article 16, on the one hand, and to rely entirely on the language of State responsibility, on the other hand, raises two issues.
First, were reference also made to Article 41(2) of the Draft Articles, the draft ers might strengthen their case. When the most egregious violations of international law are at issue, the threshold of application of the law of State responsibility is considerably lower than for situations covered by Article 16. Th e prohibition codifi ed in Article 41(2) can be invoked without having to establish that the transferring State "knew" the circumstances of the wrongful conduct. Moreover, it covers acts of aid or assistance that do not materially contribute to the wrongful conduct, as long as these helped to maintain the illegal situation.
Second, by relying solely on the law of inter-State relations, the drafters run the risk of limiting the application of the envisaged instrument to State-toState arms transfers. More importantly, they may be missing an opportunity to incorporate primary obligations of international law. As discussed earlier in this article, the prohibition of complicit behaviour under the law of State responsibility is a helpful starting point, but it cannot be made to encompass a positive obligation for States to investigate the end-use of the weapons they transfer. A more compelling commentary to Article 3 of the Draft Framework Convention might therefore place more emphasis on the international law obligation of States to prevent threats to the security and peace of the international community, to ensure respect for international humanitarian law, and to cooperate in the protection and fulfilment of human rights.
Standard of proof
Article 3 of the Draft Framework Convention states that the transferring State must have actual knowledge or constructive knowledge of the "likely" misuse of the weapons it licenses for export. It does not, however, specify indicators that can be used to determine when knowledge or awareness should be imputed. Providing specific indicators might reduce the risk that States that lack diligence or turn a blind eye to abusive behaviour on account of a lucrative deal will not be caught by the prohibition.
An alternative to "ought to have knowledge" is the use of an objective standard such as the "clear risk" standard chosen by the EU Code of Conduct. This standard would also be strengthened were it substantiated with indicators. It could be stipulated that the "likelihood" of weapons being used to perpetrate violations of international law will be assessed in light of statements made by the appropriate UN bodies or will depend on the adoption and effective implementation by the recipient State of certain measures concerning, for instance, use of force by law enforcement officials or the repression of violations of international humanitarian law.
Licensing of brokering activities
The Draft Framework Convention does not address brokering activities. The appended commentary explains that in choosing to focus on the obligation of States in respect of arms transfers, the drafters have proceeded "on the basis that important related issues such as brokering, licensed production and end-use monitoring will be addressed in subsequent instruments."
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The question of regulating brokers and their activities (core and related) is complex and multifaceted. Still, it appears desirable to enshrine in a future convention on arms exports, such as the Draft Framework Convention purports to be, the principle that those facilitating cross-border arms deals ought to be
